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IMPLEMENTING PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT INNOVATIONS: 
EVIDENCE FROM GOVERNMENT 
Abstract 
Using data from a government-wide survey administered by the U.S. General 
Accounting Office, we examine some of the factors influencing the development, use, 
and perceived benefits of results-oriented performance measures in government activities. 
We find that organizational factors such as top management commitment to the use of 
performance information, decision-making authority, and training in performance 
measurement techniques have a significant positive influence on measurement system 
development and use. We also tmd that technical issues, such as information system 
problems and difficulties selecting and interpreting appropriate performance metrics in 
hard-to-measure activities, play an important role in system implementation and use. The 
extent of performance measurement and accountability are positively associated with 
greater use of performance information for various purposes. However, we find 
relatively little ev idence that the perceived benefits from recent mandated performance 
measurement initiatives in the U.S. government increase with greater measurement and 
accountability. Finally, we prov ide exploratory evidence that some of the technical and 
organizational factors can interact to influence measurement system implementation and 
outcomes, often in a complex manner. 
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IMPLEMENTING PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT INNOVATIONS: 
EVIDENCE FROM GOVERNMENT 
1. Introduction 
Petformance measurement issues are receiving increasing attention as 
organizations attempt to implement new measurement systems that better support 
organizational objectives. While many of these initiatives are in the private sector, recent 
efforts to improve governmental petformance have also placed considerable emphasis on 
petformance measurement as a means to increase accountability and improve decision-
making (Ittner and Larcker, 1998). Indeed, Atkinson, Waterhouse, and Wells (1997) note 
that government agencies are at the forefront of efforts to implement new, more strategic 
petformance measurement systems. The Government Petformance and Results Act of 
1993, for example, requires United States executive branch agencies to clarify their 
strategic objectives and develop results-oriented measures of progress towards these 
objectives. Similar initiatives have been launched in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
the United Kingdom, and other countries (Smith, 1993; Hood, 1995; Atkinson and 
McCrindell, 1997). 
This study draws upon the information systems change, management accounting 
innovation, and public sector reform literatures to examine some of the factors 
influencing the implementation, use, and perceived benefits of results-oriented 
petformance measurement systems in the U.S. government. Small-sample studies in both 
the public and private sectors identify a number of potential impediments to the 
successful implementation of performance measurement innovations (e.g., GAO, 1997a; 
Gates, 1999). These impediments include identifying appropriate goals in environments 
characterized by multiple and conflicting objectives, measuring petformance on hard-to-
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evaluate or subjective goals, overcoming deficiencies in information systems, providing 
incentives for employees to use the information to improv e performance, and achieving 
management commitment to the new systems. Because many of these problems are 
present across the public and private sectors, the broad-scale implementation of new 
performance measures in the U.S. government provides an attractive setting to examine 
some of the factors influencing the success or failure of measurement system innovations. 
Consistent with information system and management accounting change models 
(e.g., Kwon and Zmud, 1987; Shields and Young, 1989), we find that organizational 
factors such as top management commitment to the use of performance information, the 
extent of decision-making authority delegated to users of performance information, and 
training in performance measurement techniques have significant positive influences on 
measurement system development and use. Howev er, we also find that technical issues 
play an important role in performance measurement system implementation and use. In 
particular, difficulties selecting and interpreting appropriate performance metrics in hard-
to-measure activities are a major impediment to measurement system innovation. Data 
limitations, such as the inability of existing information systems to provide necessary 
data in a valid, reliable, timely, and cost effective manner, also deter the use of 
performance information for accountability and performance evaluation. Technical 
issues such as these appear to play a much more important role in the implementation of 
performance measurement systems than they do in cost system implementation (e.g., 
Shields, 1995; Krumwiede, 1998, Anderson and Young, 1999). 
The extent of performance measurement and accountability are positively 
associated with the use of performance information for various purposes, consistent with 
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claims that improved performance information and incentives for achieving results can 
support governmental decision-making. Howev er, we find relatively little evidence that 
the perceived benefits from recent mandated performance measurement initiatives in the 
U .S. government increase with greater measurement and accountability. The latter 
results support institutional theories that claim systems implemented to satisfy external 
requirements are less likely to influence internal behav ior than are those implemented to 
satisfy the organization' s own needs. 
The remainder of the paper contains five sections. Section 2 prov ides an 
overview of recent performance measurement initiatives in the U.S. government and 
develops our hypotheses. Section 3 discusses our sample, followed by descriptive 
statistics on the variables used in our study in Section 4. Results are presented in Section 
5. Section 6 offers our conclusions. 
2. Background and Hypotheses 
2.1 Performance Measurement Initiatives in tlte U.S. Government 
During the 1990s, the U.S. government began enacting several major initiatives to 
promote a performance-based approach to the management and accountability of federal 
activ ities, including the Chief Financial Officers Act, the National Performance Review, 
and the Government Performance and Results Act. The stated goals of these initiatives 
are twofold: (1) to increase Congressional oversight and foster greater accountability for 
achieving results, and (2) to enhance "performance-based" decision-making by 
implementing information systems that supplement traditional input-oriented 
performance measures (e.g., expenditures and staffing levels) with measures focused on 
5 
results (e.g., output quantity, quality, and timeliness) and the achiev ement of strategic 
objectives. 
The most important initiative is the Government Performance and Results Act of 
1993 (hereafter, GPRA). The GPRA requires managers of each government activity (i.e., 
project, program, or operation) to clarify their missions and strategic objectives and to 
measure relevant outputs, service levels, and outcomes for each activity in order to 
evaluate performance toward these objectives (U .S. Senate, 1992; GAO, 1997b). Pilot 
GPRA implementations began in fiscal 1994, with all major agencies required to submit 
performance goals and indicators for each of their individual activities by fiscal 1997. 
The GPRA and related initiatives in other countries are based on the assumption 
that mandated reporting of results-oriented, strategic performance indicators can improve 
governmental efficiency and effectiveness by increasing the accountability of public 
managers (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993; Atkinson and McCrindell, 1997; Jones and 
McCaffery, 1997). According to the Governmental Accounting Standards Board' s 
Concept Statement No. 2, public sector accountability represents the duty for public 
managers to answer for the execution of their assigned responsibilities, and for citizens 
and their elected or appointed representatives to assess performance and take actions by 
allocating resources, providing recognition or rewards, or imposing sanctions based on 
the managers ' results. By making public officials, legislative bodies, and the public more 
informed about the behavior of government managers and the results of their actions, the 
performance measurement initiatives are intended to improve the allocation of 
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government resources and promote governmental efficiency and effectiveness through 
improved performance-based decision-making (Flynn, 1986; Scott, 1987).1 
2. 2 Determinants of Measurement System Implementation and Success 
Prior studies on information system change, management accounting innovation, 
and public sector reform have identified a number of factors that are expected to 
influence the implementation and success of performance measurement initiatives such as 
the GPRA. These factors include technical issues, such as the ability of existing 
information systems to provide required data and the extent to which organizations can 
define and develop appropriate measures, and organizational issues, including 
management commitment, decision-making authority, training, and legislative mandates 
(e.g., Kwon and Zmud, 1987; Shields and Young, 1989). 
Drawing upon this literature, we employ the conceptual model in Figure 1 to 
investigate the relations among these factors , the extent of measurement system 
development, and the stated objectives of governmental performance measurement 
initiativ es (i.e., greater accountability for achieving results, enhanced decision-making, 
and, ultimately, improved government efficiency and effectiveness). The following 
sections develop our hypotheses regarding the expected relations between the various 
technical and organizational factors and the extent of measurement system 
implementation and outcomes. 
1Many observers argue that the goverrunent performance measurement initiatives are emulating the private 
sector by adopting similar mechanisms for controlling principal-agent problems (Smith, 1990, 1993; 
Mayston, 1993). See Rose-Ackerman (1986), Tirole (1994), and Dixit (1997) for theoretical studies 
focused on the applicability of principal-agent models of management control practices in the public sector. 
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2.2.2 Information System Capabilities 
Kwon and Zmud's (1987) review ofthe information technology (IT) 
implementation literature indicates that some of the key factors influencing 
implementation success are technological issues. These issues include the compatibility 
ofthe new system with existing systems, system complexity, and the system's relative 
improvement over existing systems (e.g., accuracy and timeliness). Accounting 
researchers have drawn upon this literature to argue that the success of management 
accounting innovations should also be a function of the current information system's 
capabilities. Krumwiede (1998), for example, suggests that organizations with higher 
quality information systems may be able to implement new measurement systems more 
easily than organizations with less sophisticated information systems because 
measurement costs are lower, leading to a positive relation between current information 
system capabilities and implementation success. Conversely, managers who are 
generally satisfied with the information from the existing system may be reluctant to 
invest the necessary resources in the new system, leading to a negative relation. 
Academic studies provide mixed evidence on the influence of information system 
issues on accounting system innovations. Shields ( 1995) finds no association between 
successful implementation of activity-based costing (ABC) and technology (i.e., type of 
software or stand-alone vs. integrated system). Anderson and Young ( 1999) find that the 
perceived quality of the existing information system is negatively related to 
management's evaluation of ABC success. Krumwiede (1998) reports a positive 
association between the strength of the existing information system and an organization's 
decision to undertake more advanced stages of ABC adoption, but not with earlier stages. 
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Surveys of performance measurement innov ations in the private sector, on the 
other hand, indicate that information system problems represent a major impediment to 
implementation success. Many of these problems relate to the ability of existing 
information systems to provide required data in a reliable, timely, and cost effective 
manner. Gates' ( 1999) study of strategic performance measurement (SPM) systems 
concludes that most companies ' information technologies (IT) are limited in their ability 
to deliver rapid and consolidated results for analysis. In addition, nearly 60% of his 
respondents avoid using certain strategic performance measures due to limitations in their 
IT systems, 22% do not believe their IT systems capture data sufficiently, and 57% are 
forced to capture at least some SPM information manually. A survey of balanced 
scorecard users by Towers Perrin also finds that the lack of highly-developed information 
systems is a problem or major problem in 44% of scorecard implementations (Ittner and 
Larcker, 1998). 
Small-sample field studies in the public sector report similar results (Jones, 1993; 
GAO, 1997a). These studies suggest that information system problems in government 
organizations are compounded by the need to use data collected by other organizations 
(e.g., other federal organizations, state and local agencies, and non-gov ernment recipients 
of federal funds) and difficulties ascertaining the accuracy and quality ofthis data. 
Krav chuk and Schank ( 1996) conclude that the intergovernmental structure of many 
programs results in serious measurement problems when the information systems used by 
different organizations vary in terms of data definitions, technology, ease of accessibility, 
and amount of data retained. If these information system limitations prev ent managers 
from receiving timely and reliable data, the performance measurement system 's use for 
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accountability and decision-making purposes is likely to be limited (Jones, 1993; 
Kravchuk and Shank, 1996). 
These issues prompt our first hypothesis: 
H1: Performance measurement development and outcomes are negatively 
associated with problems obtaining necessary data in a reliable, timely, and cost 
effective manner. 
2.2.3 Selecting and Interpreting Performance Metrics 
A second technical issue highlighted in the performance measurement literature is 
the ability to define and assess metrics that capture desired actions and outcomes. 2 In 
many public and private sector settings, employees carry out many tasks that are difficult 
to accurately evaluate using objective, quantifiable performance metrics (e.g., basic 
research and development activities). In these settings, theoretical studies indicate that 
the implementation and effectiveness of performance measurement systems are likely to 
be low (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991), with greater emphasis placed on 
subjective, qualitative judgments when evaluating performance than on quantitative 
performance metrics (e.g., Prendergast, 1999). 
Surveys of private sector measurement practices indicate that problems 
identifying and measuring appropriate performance metrics represent significant 
impediments to system success. Gates ( 1999) finds that the leading roadblocks to 
implementing strategic performance measurement systems are avoiding the measurement 
of"difficult-to-measure" activities (55% of respondents), measuring ' 'the right things 
2 The terms performance metric and performance measure are interchangeable. We refer to performance 
metrics when discussing the identification, development, and interpretation of specific performance 
measures for evaluating managerial performance or aiding decision-making. We refer to performance 
measure development or performance measurement systems more generally as a collection of performance 
metrics that are reported on a regular basis through the organization' s information systems. 
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wrong" (29%), and measuring '"the wrong things right" (29%). Similarly, the Towers 
Perrin survey of balanced scorecard users finds that 45% of respondents view the need to 
quantify qualitative results to be a major implementation problem (Ittner and Larcker, 
1998). 
In the public sector, empirical and theoretical studies indicate that problems 
selecting appropriate metrics and interpreting results often stem from four features 
common to many federal programs (as well as many activities in the private sector): (1) 
the complicated interplay of federal, state, and local government activities and objectives, 
(2) the aim to influence complex systems or phenomena whose outcomes are largely 
outside government control (e.g., programs that attempt to intervene in ecosystems, year-
to-year weather, or the global economy), (3) missions that make it hard to develop 
measurable outcomes (e.g., prevention of a rare event such as a presidential 
assassination), to attribute results to a particular function (e.g., reductions in 
unemployment), or to observe results in a given year (e.g., basic scientific research), and 
(4) difficulties measuring many dimensions of social welfare or other governmental goals 
(e.g., Tirole, 1994; Dixit, 1997; GAO, 1997a). The GAO (1997a) argues that problems 
such as these can force organizations to develop performance metrics that are incomplete 
or uninformative in order to meet the GPRA's reporting requirements, with limited use of 
the resulting metrics for decision-making and accountability purposes. 
These issues lead to our second hypothesis: 
H2: Performance measurement development and outcomes are negatively 
associated with difficulties selecting and interpreting appropriate performance 
metrics. 
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2.2.4 Management Commitment 
While technical factors are expected to significantly influence the implementation 
of performance measurement innovations, their impact may be secondary to that of 
organizational factors (Shields and Young, 1989). Shields ( 1995), for example, argues 
that top management support for the innovation is crucial to implementation success 
because these managers can focus resources, goals, and strategies on initiatives they 
deem worthwhile, deny resources to innovations they do not support, and provide the 
political help needed to motivate or push aside individuals or coalitions who resist the 
innovation. 
The information system change literature also highlights the role of top 
management support in creating a suitable environment for change, influencing users' 
personal stakes in the system, and increasing the appreciation of others for the potential 
contribution of the system to meeting organizational objectives (e.g., Manley 1975; 
Schultz and Ginzberg, 1984; Doll, 1985). Consequently, employees who perceive strong 
support for the system by top management are more likely to view the change favorably 
(McGowan and Klammer, 1997). 3 Top management commitment is therefore expected 
to influence both the extent to which employees feel accountable for results and their use 
of the information for decision-making. 
The need for strong top management commitment to performance measurement is 
recognized in the government reform literature. The GAO (1997b) argues that results-
oriented performance measurement initiatives will not succeed without the strong 
3 A positive relation between top management' s commitment to using new performance measures and their 
use by lower-level managers can also be explained by contagion effects, which represent the spread of a 
particular process or paradigm from one level of management hierarchy to the next (Macintosh, 1985). 
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commitment of the U.S. federal government's political and senior career leadership. 
However, Flynn ( 1986) notes that performance measurement initiatives are part of 
government efforts to cut expenditures. The implication is that efficiency improvements 
will lead to lower budgets, reducing incentives for top management to support 
performance measurement efforts. Jones (1993) adds that U.S. executive branch officials 
do not want to aid Congressional ov ersight committees in the micro-management of 
executiv e agencies, or to assist Congress in gaining leverage over the president and his 
cabinet appointees. Consequently, there may be little reason for top agency management 
to support performance measurement efforts. Jones and McCaffery ( 1997) also find that 
Congressional know ledge of and interest in performance measurement initiatives are low, 
and argue that Congress, which is motivated by short-term re-election concerns, is 
institutionally incapable of making long-range decisions based on the performance 
measures mandated by the GPRA. As a result, legislators' commitment to the 
development and use of performance information to improve governmental 
accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness is also likely to be low. Thus, our third 
hypothesis: 
H3: Performance measurement development and outcomes are positively 
associated with management commitment to the implementation and use of 
performance information. 
2.2.5 Decision-Making Authority 
Kwon and Zmud's (1987) review indicates that a second major organizational 
factor in IT implementation success is the level of worker responsibility. Anderson 
Contagion effects can occur when lower-level managers evaluate subordinates using the same criteria used 
by upper-level managers to evaluate their performance (Hopwood, 1974). 
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(1995) builds on their defmition of worker responsibility to argue that individuals ' 
reactions to management accounting change are positively related to the workers ' role 
involvement, which she defines as ' 'the centrality of the proposed solution to the 
indiv iduals' jobs, their authority and responsibilities." Consistent with this claim, a 
subsequent rev iew of ABC implementation studies identifies consistent evidence that 
implementation success is positively related to the relevance of the information for 
managers ' decisions (Anderson and Young, 1999). These results suggest that managers 
who believ e the innovation can support their decision-making activities are more likely to 
implement and use the measures. Conversely, managers who lack the authority to make 
decisions based on the new information will have little reason to embrace the innovation. 
These results suggest a positive relation between the level of decision-making authority, 
the extent of system development, and the use of performance information for decision-
making. 
The hypothesized link between decision-making authority and system 
implementation and results is also supported by economic theories, which suggest that 
the level of accountability must be aligned with the decision-rights granted to managers 
(e.g., Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman, 1997). This requirement is recognized by 
government reform advocates, who argue that greater accountability can only be achieved 
when managers have expanded authority over spending, human resources, and other 
management functions. As a result, the level of accountability is expected to be 
positively associated with decision-making authority. However, the requirement for 
greater authority creates a potential impediment to increased accountability in 
government organizations, where laws, bureaucratic rules, and the separation of powers 
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among different branches of government can place severe constraints on managers' 
decision-making authority, and thereby the extent to which they can be held accountable 
for results.4 Thus, our fourth hypothesis: 
H4: Performance measurement development and outcomes are positively 
associated with the extent to which manager's have the authority to make 
decisions based on the performance information. 
2.2.6 Training 
A third organizational factor that is expected to influence the implementation and 
results of performance measurement innov ations is the extent to which resources and 
training are provided to support the implementation (Kwon and Zmud, 1987; Shields and 
Young, 1989). Shields ( 1995) argues that training in the design, implementation, and use 
of a management accounting innovation allows organizations to articulate the link 
between the new practices and organizational objectives, provides a mechanism for 
employees to understand, accept, and feel comfortable with the innovation, and prevents 
employees from feeling pressured or overwhelmed by the implementation process. The 
provision of training resources also provides an indication that the organization is 
providing adequate resources to support the implementation, and signals management 
support for the innovation (Shields, 1995). If training resources are insufficient, then 
normal dev elopment procedures may not be undertaken, increasing the risk of failure 
(McGowan and Klammer, 1997). 
4 The GPRA allows managers to propose, and the Office of Management and Budget to approve, waivers 
of certain nonstatutory administrative requirements and controls (e.g., procurement authority or greater 
control over employee compensation). However, the GPRA does not provide agencies with authority to 
waive requirements for activities within their organizations, and does not allow any waiver of statutory 
requirements. 
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Studies of information technology and activ ity-based costing implementations 
support these claims, fmding positive associations between training investments and 
implementation success (Kwon and Zmud, 1987; Anderson and Young, 1999). 
Accordingly, our fifth hypothesis is : 
H5: Performance measurement development and outcomes are positively 
associated with the extent of related training provided to the manager. 
2.2. 7 Legislative Mandates 
Institutional theory suggests a fourth organizational factor that may be particularly 
relev ant to implementation success in government organizations : whether or not the 
performance measurement innov ation is being implemented in response to legislative 
mandates or requirements (e.g., Scott, 1987; Cov aleski and Dirsmith, 1991; Gupta et al. , 
1994; Brignall and M odell, 2000). Institutional theory argues that organizations gain 
legitimacy by conforming to external expectations regarding appropriate management 
control systems in order to appear modem, rational, and efficient to external observers, 
but tend to separate their internal activ ities from the externally-focused symbolic systems . 
In particular, Scott (1987) claims that in institutional env ironments such as government 
organizations, where survival depends primarily on the support of external constituents 
and only secondarily on actual performance, external bodies have the authority to impose 
organizational practices on subordinate units or to specify conditions for remaining 
eligible for funding. As a result, subordinate organizations will implement the required 
practices, but the changes will tend to be superficial and loosely tied to employees ' 
actions. 
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A number of empirical studies support these theories, finding that government 
organizations that implement management accounting systems to satisfy legislative 
requirements make little use of the systems for internal purposes (Ansari and Euske, 
1987; Geiger and Ittner, 1996; Brignall and Modell, 2000). Studies of previous 
management control initiatives in the U.S. government (i.e., Planning, Programming, and 
Budgeting, Management-by-Objectives, and Zero-Base Budgeting) also indicate that 
these practices were used more as political strategies for controlling and directing 
controversy than as tools for improving accountability or decision-making (e.g., Dirsmith 
et al., 1980). These studies suggest that the recent performance measurement mandates 
in the U.S. government may increase the development of results-oriented performance 
measures but have little effect on accountability, use, or performance, leading to our sixth 
hypothesis: 
H6: Performance measurement systems that are implemented to comply with the 
GPRA's requirements are positively associated with performance measurement 
development, but are not associated with greater accountability or use of 
performance data, or with the perceived benefits from GPRA implementation. 
2.3 Measurement System Development and System Outcomes 
Many government reform advocates contend that the mere availability and 
reporting of results-oriented performance information fosters improved decision-making 
by government managers. Consistent with our previous hypotheses, these claims imply a 
direct relation between measurement system development and system outcomes. Others, 
however, argue that these improvements only occur when the performance measures are 
used to increase managers' accountability for achieving objectives (e.g., Smith, 1990, 
1993; Mayston, 1993; Whynes, 1993; Tirole, 1994; Dixit, 1997), thereby increasing the 
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managers' incentives to use the information for decision-making. Taken together, these 
arguments prompt our final hypothesis: 
H7: Performance measurement system development has positive direct effects on 
system outcomes, as well as indirect effects through the level of accountability for 
results. 
3. Research Design 
3.1 Sample 
We test our hypotheses using data collected by the United States General 
Accounting Office (GAO). The GAO survey targeted a random sample of 1,300 middle-
and upper-level civilian managers working in the 24 largest executive branch agencies. 
These agencies represented 97% of the executive branch's full-time workforce and over 
99% of the federal government's net outlay in fiscal 1996. The sample was stratified by 
whether the manager was a member of the Senior Executive Service (SES) and whether 
the manager worked in an agency or agency component designated as a GPRA pilot. 5 
The questionnaire was pretested using 32 managers from four agencies and revised based 
on their feedback. 
The survey was distributed between Nov ember 27, 1996 and January 3, 1997. 
Managers who did not respond to the initial mailing were sent a follow-up questionnaire. 
Analysis of responses to the second request revealed no significant differences from 
5 Members of the Senior Executive Service represent 44.2% of the sample and GPRA pilot sites represent 
65.4%. The senior executive stratification was used to control for potential differences in responses by 
senior managers and lower-level managers by ensuring representative sampling of each group. Stratified 
sampling of GPRA pilot and non-pilot activities was used because pilot sites were expected to be further 
along in implementing performance measures than other agencies. The GAO excluded pilots that were 
designated in fiscal year 1996 because any significant initiatives would have been fairly recent and may not 
have been sufficiently implemented for any effects to be reflected in questionnaire responses. Most 
selected pilots were designated in fiscal 1994 and encompassed the entire agency or a major agency 
component. 
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earlier responses. Usable surveys were received from 69% of the original sample.6 Of 
the 905 respondents, 108 stated that they did not have performance measures for their 
activities and are excluded from our tests. 7 
Our initial sample consists of the 797 remaining managers with usable responses. 
Final sample sizes in our tests range from 380 to 528 due to missing data.8 
We use the manager of an individual program, project, or operation (henceforth an 
activity) as our unit of analysis rather than some higher unit (e.g., average responses by 
all managers within a major program or entire agency) for several reasons. First, many of 
the survey questions address individual managers' own activities, such as the extent to 
which respondents have performance measures for the individual programs, projects, or 
operations they are responsible for, the extent to which they feel accountable for results, 
and the extent to which they use performance information to manage their activities. 
Second, field research by the GAO ( 1997b) finds that the development of performance 
measures varies significantly within a given program or agency, and indicates that 
6 Of the original sample of 1,300 managers, 47 were eliminated because the individuals had retired, died, 
left the agency or had some other reason that excluded them from the population of interest, 22 could not 
be located, 23 refused to participate, 299 questionnaires were not returned, and 4 were returned unusable. 
7 We exclude managers without performance measures because these managers were not required to answer 
many of the questions used to develop the constructs used in our analyses. A multivariate logit analysis 
examining whether a manager had performance measures of any kind found no differences with respect to 
the type of activity, number of employees, or the percentage of other activities in the same major program 
that had measures. Senior executives were more likely to have measures for their activities than lower-
level managers. Managers with measures also reported greater accountability for achieving results than 
those without measures. Finally , the presence of performance measures was more likely when the manager 
belonged to a G PRA pilot site. 
8 The majority of missing data relates to "no basis to judge" responses to questions. Most of the survey 
response scales range from 1 = "to no extent" to 5 = "to a very great extent." All of the questions offer a 
"no basis to judge" response. When this response relates to the respondent' s own activities, we code the 
answer "to no extent," assuming that these topics have little or no impact on an activity if the manager has 
no basis to respond. In all other cases (e.g., use of performance information for decisions above the 
respondent's level or perceived results from performance measurement initiatives), "no basis to judge" 
responses are omitted from the analyses. Final sample sizes for each of the variables used in our tests are 
provided in Table 1. 
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managers of some activities have made greater progress implementing measurement 
systems than others in the same organization. Finally, organizational theory suggests that 
individual managers are the appropriate unit of analysis because the beliefs and behaviors 
of individuals toward a particular innovation are shaped by their unique, individual 
circumstances within the organization (Anderson and Young, 1999). 
3.2 Variables 
The GAO survey provides substantial information on performance measurement 
practices and their hypothesized determinants in U.S. government activities. Where 
possible, we employ multiple indicators for each construct. Factor analysis is used to 
reduce the dimensionality of the individual questions and minimize measurement error. 
The resulting multi-indicator constructs are computed using mean standardized responses 
to the survey questions loading greater than 0.50 on the respective factors. We assess 
construct reliability for the multi-item variables using factor analysis and Cronbach 
coefficient alphas. All of the indicator variables pertaining to a given construct load on a 
single factor, with coefficient alphas above the minimum level suggested by Nunnally 
(1967) for adequate construct reliability. Specific questions, response scales, and 
descriptive statistics for the constructs used in our analyses are provided in Table 1. 
3.2.1 Measurement System Development 
System development is assessed using the variable l\.1EASUREJ\.1ENT, which 
captures the extent to which respondents have developed different types of results-
oriented performance measures (where 1 = to no extent and 5 = to a very great extent) for 
the activities they are involved with, from the following list: quantity of products or 
services, operating efficiency, customer satisfaction, product or service quality, and 
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measures that demonstrate to someone outside the agency whether the organization is 
achieving its intended results.9 
3.2.2 System Outcomes 
We evaluate system outcomes using three constructs capturing the stated objectives 
of governmental performance measurement efforts: greater accountability, enhanced 
decision-making, and improved governmental performance.10 
Four questions measure the extent to which managers feel they are held accountable 
for results. Respondents were asked to rate the following statements on a five-point scale 
(where 1 =to no extent and 5 =to a very great extent): (1) managers at my level are 
accountable for the results ofthe program(s)/project(s)/operations(s) they are responsible 
for, (2) employees in my agency receive positive recognition for helping the agency 
accomplish its strategic goals, (3) the individual I report to periodically reviews with me 
the results or outcomes of the program(s)/project(s)/operations(s) I am responsible for, 
and ( 4) the lack of incentives (e.g., rewards or positive recognition) has hindered using 
performance information. The last question is reverse-coded when developing the 
construct. 
9 The fact that all of the performance measure categories load on a single factor indicates that managers of 
activities tend to implement all of these measures together. This is consistent with theories calling for 
greater measurement diversity in strategic performance measurement systems, but is inconsistent with 
theories stating that the types of measures should be tailored to reflect the organization' s strategies or the 
specific actions desired of agents in multitasking environments. See Ittner et al. (2002) for a discussion of 
these theories. Additional analysis by type of activity and other contingency variables provided no 
additional insight into the greater combined use of all these variables. However, the performance 
measurement categories in the survey are consistent with the GPRA's requirements for output, service 
level, and outcome measures for each activity. Consequently, the greater implementation of measures 
related to each of these categories may reflect efforts to meet the Act' s requirements. 
10 Our outcome variables are similar to those used to evaluate the success of activity-based costing 
implementations. See, for example, Foster and Swenson (1997) and Anderson and Young (1999). 
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Eleven questions address the use of performance measures. Factor analysis with 
oblique rotation indicates that these questions represent two underlying constructs. Eight 
questions loading greater than 0.50 on the first factor reflect lower-level uses related to 
the managers' own activities (denoted MGR USE). These questions ask the extent to 
which respondents use performance information for the activities they are involved with 
when: (1) setting program priorities, (2) allocating resources, (3) adopting new program 
approaches or changing work processes, ( 4) coordinating program efforts with other 
internal or external organizations, (5) refining program performance measures, (6) setting 
new or revising existing performance goals, (7) setting individual job expectations for 
subordinates, and (8) rewarding subordinate government employees. 
Three questions loading greater than 0.50 on the second factor emphasize higher-
level uses of performance information (denoted HIGHER USE). These questions address 
the extent to which performance information is used to develop the agency's budget, 
make funding decisions, and make management changes above the respondent's 
organizational level. 
Finally, we examine the benefits from the U.S. government' s recent performance 
measurement mandates using two questions on the perceived results from the 
Government Performance and Results Act. While government reform advocates contend 
that the GPRA 's externally-imposed reporting practices will improve governmental 
performance (particularly in the presence of greater accountability), institutional theory 
argues that mandated practices will have little effect on governmental performance 
regardless of the extent of system implementation. The two questions ask the extent to 
which respondents believe that efforts to implement the GPRA have improved their 
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organizations ' activities to date (denoted RESULTS TO DATE), or will improve them in 
the future (denoted FUTURE RESULTS). Since many respondents were not sufficiently 
involved in GPRA efforts to have an opinion on its current effects, we treat each question 
separately. 
3.2.3 Implementation Factors 
Following Kwon and Zmud (1987), Shields and Young (1989), and others, we 
examine both technical and organizational influences on the measurement system 
outcome variables. The variables used to measure the hypothesized implementation 
factors are discussed below. 
3.2.3.1 Data Limitations and Metric DiffiCulties 
The survey contains 11 questions on potential factors hindering performance 
measurement and management. Consistent with discussions in the performance 
measurement literature, factor analysis with oblique rotation reveals two underlying 
dimensions with eigenvalues greater than one.11 Four questions loading greater than 0.50 
on the first factor (denoted DATA LIMITATIONS) emphasize limitations in existing 
information systems' ability to provide required data. These questions address 
difficulties obtaining valid or reliable data, difficulties obtaining data in time to be useful, 
the high cost of collecting data, and the inability of existing information systems to 
provide the needed data. 
Five questions loading greater than 0.50 on the second factor (denoted l\1ETRIC 
DIFFICULTIES) relate to problems defining and interpreting performance metrics. The 
11 Questions concerning implementation problems were only asked to respondents who had performance 
measures for their activities. Two questions about (1 ) different parties using different definitions to 
measure performance, and (2) difficulty resolving conflicting interests of internal and/or external 
stakeholders did not load 0.50 or greater on any factor. These questions are not included in our analyses. 
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questions ask managers the extent to which they have experienced difficulties 
determining meaningful measures, associating their activ ities with future results, 
distinguishing results due to their activities from other factors, and determining how to 
use performance information to improv e activities or set goals. 
3.2.3.2 Management Commitment 
We develop the construct COl\.1I'v1ITl\1ENT to measure the extent to which top 
leadership is committed to achieving results v ia performance measurement. 
COMMITJ\1ENT is based on three questions: (1) to what extent does the agency's top 
leadership demonstrate a strong commitment to achieving results, (2) to what extent has 
the lack of ongoing top executive commitment to using performance information to make 
program/funding decisions hindered measuring performance or using performance 
information, and (3) to what extent has the lack of ongoing congressional commitment to 
using performance information to make program/funding decisions hindered measuring 
performance or using performance information. The latter two questions are reverse-
coded when computing the construct. 
3.2.3.3 Decision-Making Authority 
The level of decision-making authority (denoted AUTHORITY) is assessed using 
responses to a single question asking whether managers at the respondent's level have the 
decision-making authority they need to help the agency accomplish its strategic goals. 
3.2.3.4 Training 
Respondents were asked whether they have received training to accomplish the 
following measurement-related tasks: (1) conduct strategic planning, (2) set program 
performance goals, (3) develop program performance measures, (4) use program 
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petformance information to make decisions, and ( 5) link the performance of 
program(s)/operation(s)/project(s) to the achievement of agency strategic goals. We code 
each response one if the agency provided training in that task, and zero otherwise. The 
construct TRAINING represents the sum of the individual responses. 
3.2.3.5 Legislative Mandates 
We proxy for the effects of legislative mandates on petformance measurement 
implementation using an indicator variable for GPRA pilot sites. The GAO (1997b) 
argues that pilot sites are likely to have more highly developed measurement systems 
than other sites due to their earlier efforts to meet the GPRA's mandate for results-
oriented performance measures. However, the GAO makes no assessment of whether 
this information is actually used to improv e accountability or decision-making. The 
variable PILOT is coded one if the activity was part of a GPRA pilot, and zero otherwise. 
3.2.4 Control Variables 
We include two control variables in our tests. Our first control is an indicator 
variable for members of the Senior Executive Service (denoted SES). This variable is 
included to control for potential differences in responses between senior and lower-level 
managers. We also include a second control variable in models examining perceived 
GPRA benefits to account for potential biases in responses by those participating in the 
implementation process. GPRA INVOLVEJ\IffiNT represents the average standardized 
response to two questions on the inv olvement of managers and their staff in GPRA 
. 1 . = 12 1mp ementabon euorts. 
12 To examine the robustness of our results to model specification, we repeated the analyses using a number 
of other control variables, including the natural logarithm of the number of employees in the activity (a size 
control), the type of activity managed by the respondent (internal agency efforts, federal government-wide 
support, research and development, service delivery, and other), and a program control for organizational 
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4. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptiv e statistics are provided in Table 1.13 The most highly-developed 
measures are volume indicators, with 60.8% of managers having these measures to a 
great or very great extent. The least developed measures relate to operating efficiency, 
with only 44.7% of managers having these measures to a great or very great extent. 
Almost 60% of respondents feel that managers at their level are held accountable 
for results to a great or very great extent. However, fewer than half ( 47.6%) note that 
their superior extensively rev iews their results with them on a periodic basis. Less than a 
quarter believe that the lack of incentives has severely hindered using performance 
information. 
Between 59.6% and 68.8% ofthe respondents report using performance measures 
extensively for managerial purposes, depending upon the type of measure. There is 
considerably lower perceived use of performance measures for higher-level decisions. 
Only 28.9% believe that results-oriented performance information has a major influence 
on budgets, the most extensive higher-level use. The least common use of performance 
information is for program, operation, or project changes by upper-level management, 
with only 23.1% of managers believing that upper-level management extensively uses the 
performance information for these purposes. 
effects on the managers' responses (measured using the average response by other managers in the same 
program). These controls had virtually no effect on our results and are excluded from the reported models . 
13 Although average standardized responses are used to compute some of the constructs, we report 
unstandardized responses in Table 1 to provide insight into the performance measurement practices in our 
sample. Means (standard deviations) for the standardized constructs are - 0.002 (0.182) for 
MEASUREMENT, 0.048 (0.700) for ACCOUNTABILITY, 0.005 (0.830) for MGR USE, 0 .100 (0.873) 
for HIGHER USE, 0.006 (0.821) for DATA LIMITATIONS, 0.007 (0.753) for METRIC DIFFICULTIES, 
0.021 (0.764) for COMMITMENT, and 0.461 (0.498) for GPRA INVOLVEMENT. 
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Most managers rate the benefits from GPRA implementation relatively low. Only 
13.7% feel that the GPRA has improved agency performance to a great or very great 
extent to date, with 34.7% feeling it will have a great or very great impact in the future. 
In contrast, 52.3% believe the GPRA has had little or no impact to date, while 29.9% 
believe its impact will be small to nonexistent in the future (not shown in the table). 
4.1 Correlations 
Table 2 prov ides Spearman correlations among the v ariables used in our study . 
More than 75% of the associations are significant at the 5% level or better (two-tailed). 14 
Performance measure development, accountability, and uses are positively related to each 
other, negatively related to system and measurement problems, and positively related to 
the extent of management commitment, decision-making authority, and training. These 
variables are also positively related to whether the manager is a senior executiv e (SES) 
and the extent of GPRA involvement. 
The perceived benefits of GPRA-related activities (both to date and in the future) 
are positively associated with performance measure dev elopment, accountability, and 
use. Organizations that demonstrate a strong commitment to results are also more likely 
to allow greater decision-making authority, to provide more training, to have a greater 
proportion of senior executive respondents, and to have greater GPRA involvement. 
14 Pearson correlations are virtually identical and are available from the authors upon request. Despite the 
significant correlations, all Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores are below 2.5, indicating no serious 
problems with multicollinearity in subsequent regression models. 
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5. Results 
5.1 Performance Measure Development 
Table 3 prov ides evidence on the determinants of results-oriented performance 
measure development. Due to missing responses for some of the v ariables, the sample 
size is 528 in this analysis. The resulting regression is highly significant, with an 
adjusted R2 of30%. 
Most of the results support our hypotheses. 15 Metric difficulties (i.e., difficulties 
determining meaningful measures, results occurring too far into the future to be 
measured, difficulties distinguishing between results produced by the program and results 
caused by other factors, and difficulties determining how to use performance information 
to improve the program or to set new or revise existing performance goals) significantly 
dampen the extent of performance measure development. Top management commitment, 
decision-making authority, and the level of training provided to managers all exhibit 
significant positive associations with performance measure development. Moreover, 
GPRA pilot sites have performance measures to a greater extent than non-pilots, 
indicating that efforts to meet the Act's requirements have increased measurement system 
development. 
One result that differs from our hypotheses is the insignificant relation between 
data limitations (i.e., difficulties obtaining valid or reliable data, difficulties obtaining 
data in time to be useful, and the high cost of data collection) and the development of 
performance measurement systems. Contrary to Hypothesis Hl, data limitations do not 
appear to affect measurement system development. The coefficient on SES is also 
15 One-tailed tests are used for all of the variables with hypothesized signs and two-tailed tests are used for 
control variables. Variables with p-values of 0.05 or less are considered statistically significant. 
28 
statistically insignificant, indicating that measurement system development is no higher 
for senior executives' activities than for lower-level activities. 
One limitation to the preceding analysis is the assumption that the various 
technical and organizational factors independently influence the extent of performance 
measurement development. However, it is possible that these factors interact to impact 
the development of results-oriented performance measures. Giv en the large number of 
potential interactions and limited theory on how these factors interrelate, we employ an 
exploratory technique called CHAID (CHi-squared Automatic Interaction Detection) to 
examine whether interactions among the predictor v ariables hav e significant effects on 
measurement development. CHAID modeling selects a set of predictors and their 
interactions that optimally predict the dependent variable. The technique assesses 
whether splitting the sample based on the predictor variables leads to a statistically 
significant discrimination (p < 0.05) in the dependent variable using either chi-squared 
tests or F-tests, depending upon whether the predictor variable is categorical or 
continuous. The first split represents the difference in a single predictor variable that is 
most significant in explaining differences in the dependent variable. This splitting 
continues until no further split of a predictor variable prov ides significant differences in 
the dependent variable. The final splits, or "terminal nodes", represent subgroups of 
observations that are maximally different from each other on the dependent variable, and 
can be characterized by the scores for the various predictor v ariables used to split the 
sample into these subgroups. 16 
16 Another advantage ofCHAID analysis is the ability to detect non-linearities in the associations between 
the predictor variables and the dependent variable. See Breiman (1984) andAnswerTree (1998) for 
discussions of CHAID and other related methods. 
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The CHAID analysis (not reported in the tables but available from the authors) 
indicates that the highest lvffiASURElvffiNT scores are found in government activities 
that have received training in all five measurement-related topics and have relatively low 
metric difficulties and data limitations (mean standardized lvffiASURElvffiNT score = 
0.88). The lowest lvffiASURElvffiNT scores are found in activities with training in fewer 
than five of the measurement-related topics, extensive problems selecting and 
interpreting appropriate performance metrics, and low decision-making authority (mean = 
-0. 72). High management commitment increases the development of performance 
measures in activ ities that have received training in fewer than five of the surveyed topics 
and hav e medium levels of metric difficulties (mean = 0.43 in these activ ities vs. - 0.05 in 
activities with similar training levels but relatively low management commitment), but is 
not a significant discriminator of performance measure development in the other 
subgroups. 
Overall, the preceding findings are consistent with prior studies on the 
organizational determinants of information system and management accounting 
innovation. However, our findings regarding the technical problems associated with the 
development of organizational performance measures are mixed. We find no evidence 
that data limitations are related to performance measure development in the regression 
models. Moreov er, the CHAID analyses indicate that data limitations only influence 
measurement system development when training is extensive and metric difficulties are 
low, in which case fewer data limitations are associated with greater measurement system 
development. In contrast, we find strong and consistent evidence that difficulties 
selecting and interpreting metrics have a negative impact on performance measurement 
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implementation. These results suggest that problems identifying appropriate measures 
and understanding their causal relationships will be particularly important as more public 
and private sector organizations attempt to implement systems to measure "intangible 
assets" and "intellectual capital," and to develop organizational models of leading and 
lagging indicators of performance. 
5.2 Accountability 
We next examine factors influencing the outcomes from measurement system 
development. As Smith (1990) notes, one of the keys to evaluating the effectiveness of a 
governmental information system is determining the extent to which the system allows 
principals (i.e., citizens and their elected or appointed representatives) to satisfactorily 
control their agents. Evidence on the determinants of accountability is presented in Table 
4. The model is highly significant, and explains 51% of the variation in the 
ACCOUNT ABILITY construct. 
Perhaps the most important question is whether performance measure 
development is associated with increased accountability, as emphasized in the 
government reform literature. Consistent with Hypothesis H7, the extent of performance 
measure development is positively associated with the extent to which government 
managers are held accountable for results (p < 0.00 1). The positive and significant 
association supports claims that the reporting of governmental performance information 
enhances principals' ability to hold their agents accountable for results. 17 
17 Following discussions in the govenunent reform literature, the tests in Table 4 assume that the extent of 
accountability is a function of performance measure development. However, prior studies suggest that the 
direction of causality may run from incentives to system development since employees need to see the link 
between incentives and the system innovation to support its implementation (e.g., Shields, 1995; Anderson 
and Young, 1999). Moreover, economic theories suggest that accountability and performance 
measurement levels should be simultaneous determined (e.g., Rose-Ackerman, 1986). To examine the 
direction of causality, we estimated a simultaneous equations model with ACCOUNTBILITY and 
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Several of the implementation factors also explain differences in accountability, 
even after controlling for their influence on measurement development. These results 
suggest that some of the implementation factors have direct effects on accountability, as 
well as indirect effects through measurement development. Management commitment, 
decision-making authority, and training in performance measurement topics all exhibit 
significant, positive direct and indirect effects on accountability. Thus, the extent to 
which government managers are held accountable for achieving results is influenced not 
only by the extent of performance measurement, but also by managers' know ledge of and 
ability to apply results-oriented management techniques and by top management's 
commitment to achieving results. 18 
In contrast to the insignificant relation with performance measure development, 
data limitations (i.e. , problems providing necessary, relevant, and v alid performance data 
in a timely and cost effective manner) are negatively associated with the extent to which 
managers are held accountable for results. Difficulties selecting and interpreting 
appropriate performance metrics (METRIC DIFFICULTIES), on the other hand, have no 
direct effect on accountability, ev en though they are significantly associated with the 
extent of measurement. These results provide mixed support for our hypotheses, and 
MEASUREMENT as dependent variables. Following the results in Tables 4 and 5, DATA 
LIMITATIONS served as the instrument for ACCOUNTABILITY and METRIC DIFFICULTIES as the 
instrument for DEVELOPMENT. The coefficient on MEASUREMENT was positive and significant in the 
ACCOUNTABILITY model (p < 0.023, one-tailed), but ACCOUNTABILITY was not significant in the 
DEVELOPMENT model (p = 0.35, one-tailed). Thus, the extent of accountability appears to be a function 
of performance measure development in this setting. 
18 The positive association between top management commitment and accountability is not surprising since 
it is unlikely that managers who are not committed to the use of performance information would hold their 
subordinates accountable for achieving performance objectives. However, the model's significant 
explanatory power is not primarily due to this association. When COMMITMENT is removed from the 
model, the adjusted R 2 falls from 0.51 to 0.44, indicating that the management commitment variable only 
explains approximately 7% of the variation in the accountability construct. 
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suggest that data and metric problems have different effects on performance 
measurement outcomes. Problems developing performance metrics appear to be a 
significant impediment to the initial development of performance measurement systems, 
but to have little influence on the use of the resulting system for holding managers 
accountable once these problems are resolved. In contrast, data problems do not impede 
the development ofthe measurement system, but tend to deter government officials from 
using the resulting system for performance ev aluation. The latter result is consistent with 
Krumwiede's (1998) finding that information system issues have a significant influence 
on whether organizations undertake later stages of ABC adoption, but not on whether 
they undertake earlier stages. 
Despite the previous evidence that GPRA pilot sites have developed performance 
measures to a greater extent than non-pilot sites, we find no evidence that pilot sites hold 
managers accountable for results to a greater extent than other units. This fmding 
supports institutional theories that government organizations implement management 
control systems to meet legislative requirements but do not use these systems for internal 
purposes (Hypothesis H6).19 Additionally, senior executives (SES) feel less accountable 
for results than do lower-level government managers. 
We again use exploratory CHAID analysis to examine potential interactions 
among the hypothesized determinants of accountability. The CHAID results (not 
reported in the tables) indicate that the most important predictors of 
19 Further support for this conclusion is provided by our analysis of performance measurement changes 
over the past three years (not reported in the tables). The survey provided data on both current and past 
performance measurement and accountability practices. The GAO argues that most of these recent changes 
have been prompted by new government requirements for performance information. Although reported 
measurement levels are statistically larger than those three years prior (p < 0.05, two-tailed t-test), these 
increases are not statistically associated with changes in accountability, again suggesting that recent 
performance measurement mandates are not achieving their goal of promoting greater accountability. 
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ACCOUNT ABILITY are the level of decision-making authority and the extent 1 of 
management commitment. Activities reporting ' 'very extensive" authority have the 
highest mean standardized ACCOUNTABILITY scores (1.05), while activities reporting 
no decision-making authority have the lowest mean scores ( -0.81). For the other three 
levels of decision-making authority, the extent of accountability depends upon 
management' s commitment to the use of performance information. For example, in 
activ ities reporting "extensive" decision-making authority, the mean 
ACCOUNTABILITY score equals 0.78 in the subgroup with very high management 
commitment, 0.55 in those with relatively high commitment, 0.31 when commitment is 
relatively low, and -0.01 when management commitment is very low. Similar results are 
found in activities with decision-making authority scores of2 or 3 (where 1 = ' 'to no 
extent" and 5 = ' 'to a very great extent" ). Thus, the interaction between the level of 
decision-making authority and the extent of management commitment to the use of 
performance information has a significant impact on the level of accountability for results 
only when decision-making authority is neither very high nor very low in activities where 
decision-making authority is neither extremely high nor extremely low. 
5.3 Use of Performance Information 
Table 5 investigates the factors influencing the use of performance information 
for lower-level and higher-lev el decision-making. The tests provide strong evidence that 
the extent of performance measure development and accountability are positively related 
to the use of results-oriented performance information (p < 0.00 1), both by managers for 
their own activities and for higher-level decisions. Together with the results in Table 4, 
this evidence suggests that greater performance measure development has both direct 
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effects and indirect effects (through accountability) on the use of performance 
information. These results are consistent with Hypothesis H7, and support claims that the 
benefits from the dev elopment of measurement systems are greater when managers are 
held accountable for results. However, the significant direct effects are inconsistent with 
claims that managers must be held accountable for gov ernmental performance 
measurement initiatives to be effective. 
In contrast to Hypothesis H 1, data limitations are pas itively associated with the 
use of performance information at the manager's lev el and for higher-level decisions. 
One explanation for these results is that managers do not experience significant problems 
with information systems and data collection until the information is actually being used 
for decision-making. This interpretation is consistent with our earlier findings that data 
limitations do not prevent performance measures from being dev eloped, but do make it 
more difficult to hold managers accountable for results. 
As predicted, difficulties selecting and interpreting performance metrics are 
negativ ely associated with lower-level managerial uses of performance information. 
However, these difficulties are not directly associated with higher-level uses after 
controlling for system development and accountability. In contrast, top management 
commitment, decision-making authority, and training are all positively associated with 
greater higher-level uses of performance information, but not lower-level uses. These 
differential results suggest that any effects of management commitment, decision-making 
authority, and training on the respondents ' use of performance information for managing 
their own activities come indirectly through the influence of greater measurement system 
development and perceived accountability for results. However, these implementation 
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factors also appear to have both direct and indirect effects on respondents' beliefs about 
the use of performance information by superiors. Once again, the coefficient on the 
GPRA pilot indicator variable is insignificant, supporting the hypothesis that greater 
measurement system development in response to the Act's requirements has not 
translated into greater use of the information for internal purposes. 
CHAID analysis of interactive effects (not reported in the tables) indicates that the 
level of performance measure development and the extent of metric difficulties are the 
most significant determinants of the use of performance information for lower-level 
decisions. MGR USE progressively increases as the level of performance measure 
development increases (mean = -0.72 in the subgroup with the lowest MEASUREMENT 
scores, -0.07 in the next lowest subgroup, 0.24 in the subgroup with moderately high 
MEASUREMENT scores, and 0.65 in the high MEASUREMENT score subgroup). 
Moreover, when MEASUREMENT is moderately high, fewer problems selecting and 
interpreting performance metrics are associated with higher managerial use of 
performance information ( -0.11 when metric difficulties are high, 0.22 when metric 
difficulties are moderate, and 0.43 when metric difficulties are low). No other interaction 
is significant in the CHAID analysis. These results again suggest that greater availability 
of performance measures leads to greater use ofthis information for decision-making, but 
indicate that implementing relatively extensive performance measurement system, 
without overcoming problems selecting and interpreting appropriate performance metrics 
is likely to have little effect on managers ' actions. 
The CHAID analyses also identify a number of interactive effects on higher-level 
uses of performance information. The largest HIGHER USE scores are found in activities 
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reporting ''very extensive" decision-making authority (mean standardized HIGHER USE 
score= 0.87). This is followed by activities reporting "extensive" authority and high 
levels of measurement system development (mean= 0.72). If the manager of the activity 
reported "extensive" decision-making authority but relatively low measurement system 
development, the mean HIGHER USE score falls to 0.02. Similarly, in activities with 
medium lev els of authority (3 on the 1 to 5 scale), HIGHER USE has a score of0.44 
when :MEASURE:MENT is high, -0.002 when :MEASURE:MENT is medium, and -0.36 
when :MEASURE:MENT is low. The lowest usage scores are found in activ ities with low 
decision-making authority and low management commitment to the use of performance 
information (mean= -0.95). Limited higher-level usage is also found in activities with 
low decision-making authority, somewhat higher levels of management commitment, but 
low levels of measurement system development (mean= -0.47). This evidence suggests 
that decision-making authority, measurement system development, and management 
commitment have complex, non-linear interactive effects on the use of performance 
information for higher-level decision. 
5.4 Perceived GPRA Benefits 
Our fmal tests examine the influence ofthe hypothesized implementation factors 
and accountability on the perceived benefits from implementing the GPRA's mandated 
requirements. Table 6 displays results on the perceived benefits to date and in the future. 
The models regress perceived benefits on the predictor variables used in our earlier 
analyses and the extent of the manager's participation in GPRA implementation efforts 
(GPRA INVOL VE:MENT). 20 
20 Due to missing responses, the sample size is 380 when results to date is the dependent variable, and 434 
when expected future results is the dependent variable. 
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We find mixed evidence that performance measure development and 
accountability are related to the perceiv ed benefits from implementing the GPRA's 
requirements . Performance measure development is positively related to perceived 
results to date, but is unrelated to expected results in the future. Furthermore, 
accountability is unrelated to results to date, and negatively related to expected future 
results. At best, these results provide only weak support for the claimed benefits from 
mandated increases in performance measurement and accountability in government 
organizations. The limited perceived benefits are consistent with institutional theories 
that the implementation of mandated organizational changes in gov ernment organizations 
tends to be symbolic, with little effect on internal operations. 
The estimated coefficients on the other predictor variables also provide mixed 
support for our hypotheses. Consistent with the usage results, data limitations are 
pas itively associated with perceived benefits to date and in the future. One potential 
explanation for the significant positive coefficients on DATA LHvflTATIONS is that 
managers who have encountered impediments such as poor information systems and the 
high cost of data collection believe that implementation of the GPRA's requirements has 
helped and will continue to help overcome these problems and improv e performance. 21 
Difficulties selecting and interpreting appropriate performance metrics (METRIC 
DIFFICULTIES), on the other hand, are negatively associated with the expected future 
benefits from the U .S. government's performance measurement initiatives, suggesting 
21 The positive associations between data problems and GPRA results are not driven by the positive 
relations between data limitations and the use of performance information identified in Table 5. When the 
two usage variables are included in the G PRA results models, the coefficients on DATA LIMITATIONS 
remain positive and significant, while the significance levels of the other coefficients change little. 
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that managers believe these problems will be difficult to overcome even with the GPRA 
initiatives. 
Providing managers with the decision-making authority they need to help the 
agency accomplish its strategic goals is positively and significantly associated with 
perceived benefits to date and in the future. Together with the earlier results, this 
evidence provides strong support for claims that managers need decision-making 
authority to achieve significant benefits from performance measurement innovations. 
Managers who receive more extensive training in measurement-related topics are 
more likely to believe the GPRA is or will be beneficial. Likewise, managers who are 
more actively involved in the GPRA's implementation rate the Act's potential benefits 
higher than managers with little involvement. 
Strong commitment on the part of top leadership, on the other hand, is unrelated 
to the perceived benefits from the GPRA to date or in the future, despite the generally 
significant associations between commitment and measurement accountability and use. 
Senior executives also perceive the future benefits from implementing the GPRA's 
requirements to be lower than do lower-level managers. Despite the more extensive 
development of performance measures in GPRA pilot sites, managers of these activities 
do not rate the benefits from fulfilling the GPRA's requirements any higher than do 
managers of non-pilot activities. The insignificant coefficients again suggest that 
extensive implementation of the GPRA's mandated requirements has little influence on 
internal operations. 
CHAlD analyses (not reported in the tables) suggest that interactive effects exist 
among some of the the predictor variables. With perceived results to date, the highest 
39 
scores are found in activities with medium levels of measurement system development, 
extensive training, and high management commitment (mean= 3.4 on a scale from 1= to 
no extent and 5 =to a very great extent). Not surprisingly, the lowest perceived results 
are in activities that have undertaken little measurement system development (mean= 
1.43). For perceived future results, the highest scores are found in activities with few 
data limitations and medium levels of training (mean= 3.41). The lowest scores, in tum, 
are found in activ ities with extensiv e data limitations and very high levels of 
measurement system development (mean = 2.49). The latter finding is inconsistent with 
the regression results in Table 6, but again suggests that data limitations do not become a 
serious problem until the performance measurement system is extensively developed. 
6. Conclusions 
This study draws upon the information systems change, management accounting 
innovation, and public sector reform literatures to examine some of the factors influencing 
the implementation, use, and perceived benefits of results-oriented performance 
measurement systems in the U.S. government. We find that performance measure 
development and accountability are hindered by factors such as inadequate training, the 
inability of existing information system to provide timely, reliable, and valid data in a cost 
effective manner, difficulties selecting and interpreting appropriate performance measures, 
lack of organizational commitment to achieving results, and limited decision-making 
authority. These issues are likely to be equally important in the private sector as firms 
implement strategic performance measurement systems that capture less-traditional 
performance information. 
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We also find that GPRA pilot sites have developed performance measures to a 
greater extent to meet the Act's requirements, but do not make greater use ofthe 
information. This result is consistent with institutional theories, which contend that 
implementation of externally-mandated control systems is likely to be symbolic, with little 
influence on internal operations. In contrast, increased performance measurement 
development and accountability are positively associated with the use of performance 
information after controlling for GPRA implementation efforts, supporting claims that 
internal performance measurement efforts and greater accountability for results can 
provide the necessary information and incentives for performance-based management, 
even in the absence of mandates. Although greater measurement and accountability are 
positively associated with the use of performance information for decision-making, we 
fmd only weak evidence that performance measure development and increased 
accountability influence managers' perceptions of the benefits from complying with the 
GPRA's reporting mandates, contradicting the assumptions underlying most initiatives to 
improve governmental performance through mandated reporting requirements. Finally, 
our exploratory CHAID analyses indicate that some of these technical and organizational 
factors can have (sometimes complex) interactive effects on performance measurement 
system implementation and outcomes. 
The findings from this study are not without limitations. First, we are limited to 
perceptual measures, rather than "hard" measures such as the actual number and frequency 
of performance measures or actual outcomes. Although the perceptual measures are 
similar to those used in other survey-based management accounting studies, future 
investigations can make a significant contribution by examining the actual outcomes 
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associated with the implementation of results-oriented measurement systems. Second, we 
do not have data on a number of potential factors associated with performance 
measurement or the use of performance information, such as the activity' s competitive 
environment and the type or source of funding received by the organization (e.g., Geiger 
and Ittner, 1996; Brignall and Modell, 2000). Third, the survey did not provide 
information on the target-setting process or the level of target achievability, which are 
likely to have a significant impact on the benefits from performance measurement 
initiatives. Finally, the surveyed measurement systems may not have been in place long 
enough to provide a true reflection of their benefits. Although most of the GPRA pilot 
sites began implementing their systems more than three years prior to the study, many of 
the organizations may not have had enough time to integrate the new systems into their 
day-to-day activities. However, a more recent GAO (200 1) survey indicates that many of 
the implementation issues identified in our study, such as the lack of top management 
commitment and limited decision-making authority, remain common in the U.S. 
government. Further analysis of the GPRA's external reporting requirements provides a 
natural opportunity for researchers to examine the maturation in performance 
measurement and management control practices and the ongoing performance gains from 
their use. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics for the Survey Questions Used to Develop the Measurement 
System Development, System Outcome, and Implementation Factor Variables 
0/oGreat 
Std. or Very 
Construct and Survey Items Mean Dev. Gr eat Extentb 
MEASUREMENT (n = 757; coefficient a = 0.87) 
To what extent do you have the following performance measures for 
your activities? a 
1. Quantity of products or services provided 3.63 1.15 60.8% 
2. Operating efficiency 3.25 1.16 44.7% 
3. Customer satisfaction 3.22 1.20 45.2% 
4. Quality of products or services provided 3.25 1.16 46.6% 
5. Measures demonstrating to external parties whether or not you are 3.36 1.14 51.2% 
achieving intended results 
ACCOUNTABILITY (n = 744; coefficient a = 0.70) 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? • 
1. Managers at my level are held accountable for the results of their 3.59 1.02 59.8% 
activities 
2. Employees in my agency receive positive recognition for helping 3.07 1.05 36.1% 
the agency accomplish strategic goals 
3. The individual I report to periodically reviews my activity' s 3.26 1.20 47.6% 
results with me 
4. Lack of incentives (e.g., rewards, positive recognition) has 2.61 1.23 24.7% 
hindered using performance information (reverse coded in the 
construct) 
MGR USE (n = 738; coefficient a = 0.93) 
To what extent do you use performance measurement information for 
the following activities?• 
1. Setting program priorities 3.82 1.03 68.8% 
2. Allocating resources 3.75 1.07 66.0% 
3. Adopting new program approaches or changing work processes 3.78 1.04 66.9% 
4. Coordinating program efforts with other internal or external 3.59 1.08 59.6% 
organizations 
5. Refining program performance measures 3.67 1.12 61.9% 
6. Setting new or revising existing performance goals 3.74 1.09 65.6% 
7. Setting individual job expectations for government employees I 3.68 1.09 64.5% 
manage or supervtse 
8. Rewarding government employees I manage or supervise 3.62 1.12 60.1% 
HIGHER USE (n = 624; coefficient a = 0.87) 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?• 
1. Results-oriented performance information from my activities is 2.92 1.15 28.9% 
used to develop my agency's budget 
2. Funding decisions for my activities are based on results-oriented 2.78 1.12 23.5% 
performance information 
3. Changes by management above my level are based on results- 2.68 1.14 23.1% 
oriented performance information 
RESULTS TO DATE (n = 501) 
1. To what extent do you believe that your agency's efforts to 2.45 1.03 13.7% 
implement GPRA to date have improved your agency' s 
programs/opemtions/projects? a 
FUTURE RESULTS (n = 596) 
1. To what extent do you believe that implementing GPRA can 3.08 1.10 34.7% 
improve your agency's programs/operations/projects in the fUture? a 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
0/oGreat 
Std. or Very Great 
Construct and Surve~ Items Mean Dev. Extentb 
DATA LIMITATIONS (n = 685; coefficient a= 0.84) 
To what extent have the following fuctors hindered measuring 
performance or using performance information? a 
1. Difficulty obtaining valid or reliable data 3.00 1.23 38.1% 
2. Difficulty obtaining data in time to be useful 2.80 1.23 29.6% 
3. High cost of collecting data 2.60 1.26 25.0% 
4. Existing information technology not capable of providing 2.61 1.26 26.6% 
needed data 
METRIC DIFFICULTIES (n = 701 ; coefficient a= 0.81) 
To what extent have the following fuctors hindered measuring 
performance or using performance information? • 
1. Difficulty determining meaningful measures 3.36 1.21 48.1% 
2. Results of our program(s)/operation(s)/project(s) occurring too 2.39 1.24 19.6% 
far in the future to be measured 
3. Difficulty distinguishing between the results produced by the 2.68 1.17 23.3% 
program and results caused by other fuctors 
4. Difficulty determining how to use performance information to 2.48 1.12 18.5% 
improve the program 
5. Difficulty determining how to use performance information to 2.45 1.13 19.0% 
set new or revise existing performance goals 
COMMITMENT (n = 61 1; coefficient a = 0.65) 
1. To what extent does your agency's top leadership demonstrate a 3.61 1.19 62.88 
strong commitment to achieving results? a 
2. To what extent has the lack of ongoing top executive 2.30 1.25 18.92 
commitment or support for using performance information to make 
program/funding decisions hindered measuring performance or 
using performance information? a (reverse coded in the construct) 
3. To what extent has the lack of ongoing congressional 2.66 1.41 31.77 
commitment or support for using performance information to make 
program/funding decisions hindered measuring performance or 
using performance information? a (reverse coded in the construct) 
AUTHORITY (n= 765) 
1. Agency managers at my level have the decision making authority 3.07 1.07 37.30 
needed to help the agency accomplish its strategic goals a 
TRAINING (n = 7 47) 
During the past 3 years, has your agency provided, arranged, or 
paid for training that would help you to accomplish the following 
tasks? (1 = yes, 0 =no): 
1. Conduct strategic planning 0.50 0.50 nla 
2. Set program performance goals 0.46 0.50 n!a 
3. Develop program performance measures 0.42 0.49 nla 
4. Use program performance information to make decisions 0.38 0.48 n!a 
5. Link the performance ofprogram(s)/operation(s)/project(s) to the 0.40 0.49 nla 
achievement of agency strategic goals 
GPRA INVOLVEMENT (n = 756; coefficient a = 0.91) 
To what extent have you and your staff been involved in your 
agency's efforts in implementing GPRA? a 
1. Your involvement. 2.48 1.31 23.5% 
2. Your staffs involvement. 2.19 1.28 17.3% 
a. Scale: 1 = no extent, 2 = small extent, 3 =moderate extent, 4 =great extent, 5 = very great extent. 
Reported sample sizes and coefficient alphas are for observations with responses to all of the 
questions used to compute the respective constructs. 
b. The percentage of respondents answering ' 'to a great extent" or " to a very great extent". 
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Table 2 
Spearman Correlations Among the Implementation Factor, Measurement System Development, and System Outcome Variables 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. MEASUREMENT 1.00 
2. ACCOUNT ABILITY 0.47*** 1.00 
3. MGR USE o.54'** o.4o*** 1.00 
4. HIGHER USE 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.39*** 1.00 
5. RESULTS TO DATE 0.39*** 0.29*** 0.39*** 0.47*** 1.00 
6. FUTURE RESULTS 0.14*** 0.09** 0.25*** 0.24*** o.6o*** 1.00 
7. DATA LIMITATIONS -0.21 *** -0.24*** -0.09** -0.07* -0.01 0.14*** 1.00 
8. METRIC DIFFICULTIES -0.41*** -0.37*** -0.32*** -0.23*** -0.24*** -0.06 0.57*** 1.00 
9. COMMITMENT o.38*** o.58*** 0.29*** 0.41*** o.3o*** 0.11** -0.28*** -0.44 *** 1.00 
10. AUTHORITY o.39... o.58··· 0.33 ... 0.46··· o.37... 0.11... -O.lo*** -0.22**" 0.44 ... 1.00 
11. TRAINING 0.29*** 0.24*** 0.23*** o.3o*** 0.31*** 0.14*** 0.02 -0.12*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 1.00 
12. PILOT 0.09* 0.01 0.02 0.06* 0.07* 0.01 0.004 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 1.00 
13. SES 0 .18*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.13*** 0.06 -0.02 0.01 -0.06* 0.23*** 0.21*** 0 .24*** 0 .02 1.00 
14. GPRA INVOL VEMEKT 0.35*** 0.24*** 0.27*** 0.29*** 0.42*** 0.22*** 0 07* -0 06 o.25*** o.3o*** o.39*** o.14*** 0.46*** 
YIEASUREMENT = the extent to which results-oriented perfonnance measures have been developed and implemented; ACCOUNTABILITY = the extent to which managers are 
held accountable for achieving results; MGR USE= the use of perfonnance data by managers for decision-making; HIGHER USE= the use of perfonnance infonnation for higher-
level agency or fimding decisions; RESULTS TO DATE = the perceived extent the U.S. Government Reporting and Results Act (GPRA) has positively influenced agency 
perfonnance; FUTURE RESULTS = the perceived extent the GPRA will positively influenced agency perfonnance in the future; DATA LIMITATIONS = the extent infonnation 
system or data problems hinder perfonnance measurement; METRIC DIFFICULTIES = the extent problems identifYing, developing, and assessing appropriate perfonnance metrics 
hinder perfonnance measurement; COMMITMENT = management commibnent to perfonnance measurement; AUTHORITY = respondents ' decision-making authority; 
TRAINING = training in perfonnance measurement and use of perfonnance infonnation; PILOT = GPRA pilot site; SES = member of the Senior Executive Service; and GPRA 
INVOLVEMENT = the extent respondent or staff is involved in implementing the GPRA's requirement. 
"', ~. '. indicate statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 3 
Determinants of Results-Oriented Performance Measure Development 
by U.S. Government Managers 
Hypothesized 
Sign MEASUREMENT 
DATA LI1v1ITATIONS -0.02 
(-0.36) 
METRIC DIFFICULTIES -0.28*** 
(-5.59) 
C01'v1MITMENT + 0.11 ** 
(2.40) 
AUTHORITY + 0.20*** 
(5.74) 
TRAINING + 0.07*** 
(4.63) 
PILOT + 0.13** 
(2.12) 
SES ? 0.08 
(1.33) 
Adjusted R 2 0.30 
F 33.04*** 
Sample Size 528 
Ordinary least squares coefficients, with corresponding t-statistics in parentheses. Intercept terms are not reported. 
MEASUREMENT = the extent to which results-oriented performance measures have been developed and 
implemented; DATA LIMITATIONS =the extent information system or data problems hinder performance 
measurement; METRIC DIFFICULTIES = the extent problems identifYing, developing, and assessing appropriate 
performance metrics hinder performance measurement; COMMITMENT = management commitment to performance 
measurement; AUTHORITY = respondents' decision-making authority; TRAINING = training in performance 
measurement and use of performance information; PILOT= GPRA pilot site; SES =member of the Senior Executive 
Service. 
·-, " , • indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 2.5% and 5% levels, respectively. Significance levels are one-tailed 
for predictor variables with hypothesized signs and two-tailed for control variables. 
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Table 4 
Determinants of U.S. Government Managers' 
Accountability for Achieving Results 
Hypothesized 
Sign ACCOUNT ABILITY 
MEASUREMENT 
DATA LIMITATIONS 
METRIC DIFFICULTIES 
CO:tv1MITMENT 
AUTHORITY 
TRAINING 
PILOT 
SES 
Adjusted R 2 
F-statistic 
Sample Size 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
? 
0.15*** 
(4.58) 
-0.08** 
(-2.40) 
-0.03 
(-0.90) 
0.29*** 
(8.46) 
0.27*** 
( 10.10) 
0.02* 
( 1.76) 
-0.01 
( -0.13) 
-o.o5* 
(-2.15) 
0.51 
69.81 *** 
524 
Ordinary least squares coefficients, with corresponding t-statistics in parentheses. Intercept tenns not reported. 
ACCOUNT ABILITY = the extent to which managers are held accountable for achieving results; MEASUREMENT = 
the extent to which results-oriented performance measures have been developed and implemented; DATA 
LIMITATIONS = the extent information system or data problems hinder performance measurement; METRIC 
DIFFICULTIES =the extent problems identifYing, developing, and assessing appropriate performance metrics hinder 
performance measurement; COMMITMENT = management commitment to performance measurement; AUTHORITY 
=respondents' decision-making authority; TRAINING= training in performance measurement and use of performance 
information; PILOT = GPRA pilot site; SES = member of the Senior Executive Service. 
·-, ", ·indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 2.5% and 5% levels, respectively. Significance levels are one-tailed 
for predictor variables with hypothesized signs and two-tailed for control variables. 
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Table 5 
Determinants of the Use of Results-Oriented Performance Information 
by U.S. Government Managers 
Hypothesized 
Sign MGRUSE HIGHER USE 
I'vffiASUREl\AENT 
ACCOUNT ABILITY 
DATA LIJ\1ITATIONS 
l\AETRIC DIFFICULTIES 
COl\1MIUvffiNT 
AUTHORITY 
TRAINING 
PILOT 
SES 
Adjusted R 2 
F-statistic 
Sample Size 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
? 
0.45*** 
(10.44) 
0.15*** 
(2.69) 
0.14*** 
(3 .26) 
-0.19*** 
( -3.83) 
-0.04 
(-0.75) 
0.03 
(0.74) 
0.02 
( 1.07) 
-0.08 
(-1.23) 
0.08 
( 1.35) 
0.37 
34.32*** 
508 
0.30*** 
(6.20) 
0.23*** 
(3.47) 
0.11 ** 
(2.31) 
-0.004 
(-0.08) 
0.15*** 
(2.66) 
0.18*** 
(4.23) 
0.05*** 
(2.91) 
-0.03 
(-0.47) 
-0.06 
(-0.88) 
0.38 
32.95*** 
472 
Ordinary least squares coefficients, with corresponding t-statistics in parentheses. Intercept tenns not reported. MGR 
USE = the use of performance data by managers for decision-making; HIGHER USE = the use of performance 
information for higher-level agency or funding decisions; MEASUREMENT = the extent to which results-oriented 
performance measures have been developed and implemented; ACCOUNT ABILITY =the extent to which managers are 
held accountable for achieving results; DATA LIMITATIONS =the extent information system or data problems hinder 
performance measurement; METRIC DIFFICULTIES = the extent problems identifYing, developing, and assessing 
appropriate performance metrics hinder performance measurement; COMMITMENT = management commitment to 
performance measurement; AUTHORITY = respondents' decision-making authority; TRAINING = training in 
performance measurement and use of performance information; PILOT = GPRA pilot site; SES =member of the Senior 
Executive Service. 
·-, **, *indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 2.5% and 5% levels, respectively. Significance levels are one-tailed 
for predictor variables with hypothesized signs and two-tailed for control variables. 
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Table 6 
Determinants of the Perceived Benefits From the 
U.S. Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) 
MEASUREMENT 
ACCOUNT ABILITY 
DATA LHvllTATIONS 
METRIC DIFFICULTIES 
COMMITMENT 
AUTHORITY 
TRAINING 
PILOT 
GPRA INVOLVEMENT 
SES 
Hypothesized 
Sign RESULTS TO DATE 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
? 
? 
0.26*** 
(3.36) 
-0.07 
(-0.70) 
0.21 *** 
(3.07) 
-0.22*** 
(-2.74) 
0.13 
(1.58) 
0.12** 
(1.95) 
0.07*** 
(3.02) 
0.09 
(0.85) 
0.28*** 
(4.53) 
-0.17 
( -1.62) 
FUTURE RESULTS 
0.01 
(0.11) 
-0.17* 
(-1.68) 
0.32*** 
(4.36) 
-0.19** 
(-2.21) 
0.03 
(0.30) 
0.16*** 
(2.52) 
0.06** 
(2.17) 
-0.11 
(-1.01) 
0.25*** 
(3.84) 
-0.28*** 
(-2.55) 
Adjusted R 2 0.27 0.12 
F -statistic 15 .30*** 6.86*** 
Sample Size 380 434 
Ordinary least squares coefficients, with corresponding t-statistics in parentheses. Intercepts not reported. RESULTS _TO_ DATE- the 
perceived extent the U.S. Govenunent Reporting and Results Act (GPRA) has positively influenced agency performance; FUTURE 
RESULTS= the perceived extent the GPRA will positively influenced agency performance in the future; MEASUREMENT = the 
extent to which results-oriented performance measures have been developed and implemented; ACCOUNfABILITY =the extent to 
which managers are held accountable for achieving results; MGR USE= the use of performance data by managers for decision-making; 
IDGHER USE= the use of performance information for higher-level agency or funding decisions; DATA LIMITATIONS = the extent 
information system or data problems hinder performance measurement; METRIC DIFFICULTIES= the extent problems 
identifYing , developing, and assessing appropriate performance metrics hinder p erformance measurement; 
COMMITMENT = management commitment to performance measurement; AUTHORITY= respondents' decision-making authority; 
TRAINING = training in performance measurement and use of performance information; PILOT= GPRA pilot site; SES =member of 
the Senior Executive Service; and GPRA INVOLVEMENT =the extent respondent or staff is involved in implementing the GPRA 's 
requirement 
···,·· , · indicate statistical significance at the 1 o/o, 2.5% and 5% levels, respectively. Significance levels are one-tailed for predictor 
variables with hypothesized signs and two-tailed for control variables. 
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Figure 1 
Hypothesized Conceptual Model Linking Implementation Factors, 
Measurement System Development, and System Outcomes 
Implementation Factors Measurement System Outcomes 
Development 
Information System/ 
Data Limitations 1-1 
Difficulties Selecting/ v Accountability Interpreting Metrics (-) Management Extent to Which I+ Commitment (+) Measures are 
~ 
Decision-Making Developed 
Authority(+) 
Use of 
Training (+) Measures 
Legislative Perceived 
Mandates (+ I 0) Benefits 
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